
Welcome to The Journal!
The Journal component of the University of Wisconsin Pre-Law Journal (UWPLJ) showcases research-driven articles that explore legal issues, judicial decisions, and the law’s influence on society, politics, and culture. Unlike our blog, The Journal features contributions from pre-law–focused students selected through an application process. Each article undergoes a multi-stage peer review and editorial process, with writers collaborating closely with their editors to ensure clarity and depth.
In order to read our published journal articles, please select one of our issues.
Applications for writers and editors open to UW–Madison Pre-Law Society members at the start of each fall and spring semester.
The Role of International Trade Law in Preventing Neocolonialism
By Kerem Tosun Edited by Samara Rezwan
Vol. 1, Issue 2. — July 2025
Following the events of the Second World War, there was a massive restructuring of the international regime, with worldwide independence movements leading to mass decolonization across Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and the Caribbean. Simultaneously, processes of globalization rapidly advanced due to technological developments and the creation of various international institutions such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, and the International Monetary Fund. Colonial legacies also continue to have tangible impacts on the present day. With the remnants of colonization deeply entrenched in postcolonial nations, their economies, infrastructure, and institutions work together to perpetuate a system of economic exploitation mirroring that of their colonial pasts.
Introduction
A fundamental way neocolonial actives are identified is in trade imbalances. This article explores the
effectiveness of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in regulating international trade to prevent the perpetuation of neocolonialism through its treaties, which are legally binding under international law. By analyzing the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanisms, special treatment provisions for developing nations, and structural biases in trade agreements, this article will answer whether the WTO reinforces or moderates the economic domination of former colonial states. The findings will contribute to rich debates on reforming global trade governance to ensure equitable development and sovereignty for postcolonial economies.
The World Trade Organization
The WTO is unique from the other international institutions that spawned after the Second World War in that
“WTO dispute settlement is both compulsory and binding” [1]. Truly, the WTO functions as any domestic court, with claimants and defendants making their cases before the Appellate body. Since its inception, the WTO’s primary dispute settlement mechanism was its Appellate Body. The Appellate Body is the mechanism through which the WTO makes rulings. For example, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products [2] found the U.S. in violation of General Agreements of Trade and Treaties, also known GATT, as the ban was deemed arbitrary and unjustifiably discriminatory. In response, the U.S. had to revise its ban and have it reviewed again by the WTO.
[1] Esserman & Howse, pg. 91, 2003
[2] Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998).
Neocolonialism, Trade, and EPAs
As it relates to neocolonialism and trade, the WTO has been repeatedly criticized for its intervention in the
European Union’s Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries. Under WTO rules, non-reciprocal trade preferences are deemed discriminatory, and ACP countries were required to liberalize up to 80% of their markets for EU goods to be compliant with WTO standards. In doing so, ACP nations undermined their local industries, particularly their agricultural industries, which are unable to be competitive against heavily subsidized European agriculture. Moreover, the EU retained full protections for its agricultural industry under the Common Agricultural Policy and continued to subsidize the industry and heavily imbalance global competition in agriculture. This dynamic mirrored colonial-era extractive trade patterns, wherein former colonies remained locked into roles as suppliers of raw goods while being denied meaningful industrial development.
After the establishment of EPAs, the United States complained to the WTO that this violated GATT and put U.S.
and Latin American producers at an unfair disadvantage. In European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale, and Distribution of Bananas, [3] the WTO ruled in favor of the U.S. and deemed that EPAs were discriminatory. The result of this ruling was the further weakening of already weakened markets in ACP countries. After having to reduce tariffs against heavily subsidized European agriculture, the small respite of preferential trade on key goods such as bananas gave these countries an economic lifeline that was taken away by this WTO ruling.
[3] Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997), adopted Sept. 25, 1997.
U.S. Lobbying
It is also important to consider the influence of lobbying by U.S. firms for the case. The U.S. complaint was heavily influenced by aggressive lobbying from Chiquita Brands International, demonstrating how corporate interests in wealthy nations can shape trade law to the detriment of developing economies. On the other hand, ACP countries do not have similar political or financial influence and were relegated to be bystanders in a legal battle that determined their economic fate. The Bananas dispute has become a landmark example of how neocolonial structures persist under the guise of “free trade,” with WTO rules often serving to entrench, rather than rectify, global inequalities.
Conclusion
The findings of this article suggest that the WTO has failed to curtail neocolonialist trade and properly support postcolonial nations in their paths toward further development as they failed to regulate against neocolonialism perpetuated from within postcolonial states, where the domestic elite took advantage of the infrastructure that supported colonialism to benefit themselves. Still, this does not mean the WTO cannot change the way it approaches these trade agreements. It has every means of changing its policy to account for the perpetuation of neocolonialism by elites within postcolonial states. However, the fact that the United States of America has blocked the appointment of new judges to the Appellate Body, voiding the body of its judicial power, prevents the WTO from being able to enact any positive changes through its rulings.